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the legislature." 1 9 It would seem that the November,
1980 elections, which tilted that legislature to the right,
will provide a forum that will go much further than
Harris in restricting abortions.
Justice Marshall makes an eloquent dissent in Harris
- social arguments that would be more appropriate on
the floor of the House. But Marshall can't vote on the
floor of the House. Those who can are being in-
creasingly pressured by their constituents to vote conser-
vatively and traditionally - against inflationary liberal-
ism. The Republicans in their platform asked for judges
who hold values similar to their own; some groups
frankly work as advocates for unborn children; others
question whether many abortions for reasons of "mental
health" are not simply abortions of convenience; and
still others are motivated by a simple weariness with all
give-away programs that foster dependency.
20
As early as 1974, Professor John T. Noonan, Profes-
sor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, in
his testimony before the Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, advocated a constitutional amendment that
would restore common law restrictions on abortion. The
passage of such an amendment would reflect the realiza-
tion that criticisms of Roe v. Wade are based on sound
policy considerations. Until and unless such an amend-
ment is passed, the letter of the law in Roe v. Wade is
not dead; although the spirit that produced it seems to
be.
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Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of, among other things,
sex.' There is little legislative history regarding this par-
ticular classification. During floor debate, an opponent of
the Civil Rights Act, in an effort to sabotage the bill, in-
cluded sex in the list of proscribed categories. 2 Courts
have indicated subsequently that the intent of Congress
was to prevent disparate treatment of female employees
and to equalize employment opportunities afforded each
sex. 3 It has been held that the word "sex" is commonly
understood and, therefore, requires no judicial construc-
tion.
4
42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000 e et seq.
2 See ANNOTATION, 12 A.L.R.Fed. 15, 22: Barnes v. Costle. 561
F.2d 983, 46 A.L.R.Fed. 198, 203 (1977).
3 12 A.R.L.Fed, at 22. See also Diaz v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, cert. denied. 404 U.S. 950 (1971): AN-
NOTATION, 42 A.L R. Fed. 189, 200.
4 Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454
(1970).
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The courts have not accepted the argument that dis-
crimination practiced against a homosexual is sex-based
discrimination. This Title VII issue did not even reach the
courts or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) until 1973. Homosexuality is considered a
mutable characteristic by the EEOC and therefore not
afforded Title VII protection.
As recently as 1969, the United States Civil Service
Commission maintained that "persons about whom
there is evidence that they have engaged in or solicited
others to engage in homosexual or sexually perverted
acts ... are not suitable for federal employment." 5 In
Norton v. Macy, 6 this civil service regulation was found
to be overly broad and to deny due process. The District
of Columbia Circuit held that a competent civil servant
could not be dismissed solely on the basis of private ho-
mosexual conduct. Dismissal may be justified where
there is a rational connection between deliberately pub-
lic homosexual involvement and diminished efficiency
on the job.7
5 Lasson, Kenneth, Homosexual Rights: The Law Influx and Conflict,
9 U. BALT. L. REV. 47, 64, citing Federal Personnel Manual Supple-
ment (Int.) 731-77.
6417 F.2d 1161 (1969).
7 Lasson, supra, at 64.
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There has been relatively little litigation by homosex-
uals in the private sector except to challenge discrimina-
tory hiring or firing as violative of Title VII. The courts,
as well as the EEOC, generally have held that Title VII
refers to discrimination based on gender, not sexual
preference.8 Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation is not violated where some factor besides sex (as
gender) underlies the alleged discriminatory act. 9
There is a possible Title VII argument the courts have
"ducked" in homosexual cases. If the class was com-
posed of male homosexuals who received different
treatment than their female counterparts, the discrimina-
tory variable would be sex as gender and would be
clearly prohibited by Title VII. 10
Many commentators argue that homosexuality is not
a mutable characteristic. Homosexual experiences start
before or during adolescence. 11 Theories of the origin of
sexual preference include the possibility that preference
is a physical trait acquired at birth, or that sexual prefer-
ence results from an endocrine imbalance in the male
homosexual. Conclusively, sexual preference is beyond
the individual's control from a very early age, although
there is a difference of opinion as to whether it is con-
genital. 12
The famous Kinsey Report estimated, in 1948, that
four percent of the adult white male population in the
United States is exclusively homosexual for life after the
onset of adolescence; ten percent is more or less exclu-
sively homosexual for at least three years between the
ages of sixteen and fifty-five; thirty-seven percent experi-
ence homosexual orgasm between adolescence and old
age; and fifty percent have some kind of homosexual
contact by age fifty-four. 13 Dr. Kinsey estimated that
there were at least 2,250,000 confirmed homosexuals
over eighteen in the United States. 14 A 1969 govern-
ment task force provided an increased estimate: "there
are currently three or four million adults in the United
States who are predominantly homosexual and many
more individuals in whose lives homosexual tendencies
or behavior play a significant role." '5 A later study notes
8 Id., at 67.
9 ANNOTATION, 26 A.L.R.Fed. 13, 29.
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that four to five percent of all adult males are homosex-
ual, and the percentage of female homosexuals is about
half that of males. 16 In view of these statistically signifi-
cant percentages it is surprising that the EEOC has been
unwilling to recognize discrimination against this group
as unlawful.
The EEOC has frequently relied on decisions uphold-
ing employer regulations concerning grooming and ap-
pearance as not sex-based (gender based), as no immu-
table characteristic is involved. 17 The EEOC in the past
had held that other characteristics which can be de-
scribed as mutable are protected by Title VII:1 8 sex dis-
crimination has been found when employers have
refused to hire males with beards and moustaches,
19
and race discrimination has been found when blacks
have been penalized for wearing "afros" as an expres-
sion of racial pride and heritage. 20 Nevertheless, neither
the Commission nor the courts have been willing to ex-
tend these decisions to cover homosexuality. While it
16 Siniscalco, supra at 495. citing W. POMEROY. HOMOSEXUALITY, THE
SAME SEX, AN APPRAISAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1969): D. WEST,
HOMOSEXUALITY 39-42 (1967).17 Id.. at 505.
1Id.
191d.. at 506.2 0 EEOC Decision No. 72 1380, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAc. REP :pg6364
(1971).
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may be correct to assume that long hair is not a signifi-
cant status or condition, it is simplistic to consider one's
sexual proclivities or preferences to be as easily chosen
or controllable as one's hairstyle. Given psychiatric, bio-
logical and social ignorance, it seems unreasonably arbi-
trary for the Commission to conclude that homosexual-
ity is a "preference'' sufficiently mutable as to fall
outside the scope of Title VII. The characteristic of being
homosexual would seem to fit within the category of so-
cio-biological-environmental factors with which the
courts have dealt in other contexts, such as race. 21 It is
arguable that sexual harassment of homosexuals should
be treated differently, as it is a much more serious and
traumatic form of discrimination. There have, as yet,
been no cases brought by homosexuals seeking to in-
voke protection from sexual harassment.
An extremely important case in the area of sexual har-
assment is Barnes v. Costle,22 in which a black female
alleged that her job was abolished because she repulsed
her male superior's sexual advances. The district court
had granted summary judgement for the employer on
the ground that the substance of plaintiff's complaint,
that she was discriminated against because of her refusal
to engage in a sexual affair, did not, in the court's opin-
ion, evidence an arbitrary barrier to continued employ-
ment based on her sex. The Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding that the statutory embargo on sex discrimination
is not confined to differentials founded wholly on an
employee's gender. Rather, it is enough, the court
noted, that gender is a factor contributing to the discrim-
ination in a substantial way.2
3
The court held that the discrimination was plainly
based on plaintiff's gender, noting that the supervisor
would not have made those sexual demands of a male
employee. The court noted in the footnotes that:
The vitiating sex factor thus stemmed not from
the fact that what [Plaintiff's] supervisor de-
manded was sexual activity - which of itself is im-
material - but from the fact that he imposed upon
her tenure in her then position a condition which
ostensibly he would not have fastened upon a
male employee . . . . [T]here is no suggestion the
[Plaintiff's] allegedly amorous supervisor is other
than heterosexual. 2
The court went on to note that:
It is no answer to say that a similar condition
could be imposed on a male subordinate by a het-
erosexual female superior, or upon a subordinate
21 EEOC Decision No. 71 2444, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAc. REP ;pg6240
(1971).
22561 F.2d 983. 46 A.L.R.Fed 198 (1977).
23 46 AL.R.Fed., at 208.
24 1d. at 207.21Id.. note 49.
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of either gender by a homosexual superior of the
same gender. In each instance, the legal problem
would be identical to that confronting us now - the
exaction of a condition which, but for his or her
sex, the employee would not have faced. These
situations, like that at bar, are to be distinguished
from a bisexual superior who contains the employ-
ment opportunities of a subordinate of either gen-
der upon the participation in a sexual affair. In the
case of a bisexual superior, the insistence upon
sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimi-
nation because it would apply to male and female
employees alike. 26
On the other hand, in most states and in many coun-
ties homosexual activity remains condemned as a
crime, 27 although there is a growing public and political
disposition to regard the condition as something that
should be treated - or tolerated.28 For example, Illinois,
Connecticut and Oregon have all recently changed their
criminal codes to legalize homosexual acts between con-
senting adults. 29 In Maryland, a local ordinance was
passed prohibiting discrimination based upon "sexual
preference or personal appearance." M However, it
should be noted that many legislators fear voter back-
lash should they support repeal of sodomy laws.
31
In the United States, sodomy usually is punishable by
a long prison sentence. Maryland, for example, provides
for a maximum of ten years, 32 while some states treat it
as a misdemeanor.'3 These penalties, however, may be
misleading. As one commentator notes,34 in Maryland,
homosexuals are occasionally prosecuted for the prosti-
tution offense of solicitation, 35 which is apt to carry a
fine of fifty to two hundred dollars, or a short jail sen-
tence. In Washington, D.C., homosexuals often simply
2"Id.. note 55. at 208. See also ANNOTATION. 16 A.L.R.Fed, 224.
note 1. at 225.27 See. for example. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §§ 553 54 (Suppl. 1979).
Maryland is one of 29 states that imposes criminal penalties for pri-
vate homosexual conduct between consenting adults. A recommen-
dation by the State Commission on Criminal Law to delete such
penalties was rejected by the Maryland legislation in 1976.
2' Lasson. supra. at 47, and note 1.
2"Kovarsky. supra at 527. citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38. §§ 11-3, 11
4. 11 5. and 11 9 (Smith-Hurd. 1961). Pub. L No. 838, § 214. re-
pealing. GEN. STAT. OF CONN ch. 944. § 53 216 (1969), 191 Ore.
Laws ch. 743. §§ 112 16. repealing. ORE REV STAT, § 167.040
(1953).
"'Lasson. supra note 7. at 48. citing Howard County, MD.. Code §
12.200 (1978).
'Id. Professor Lasson notes that the Community Relations Commis
sion of Baltimore drafted an ordinance prohibiting discrimination
against homosexuals, but were pessimistic over its chances for pas-
sage in an election year. citing UNPUBLISHED MINUTES OF COMMU
NIy RELATIONS COMMISSION. June 20. 1979.12 MD ANN CODE art. 27 § 553 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
;3 Fisher. supra at 92. The commentator notes, for example. that New
York carries a maximum penalty of 3 months in Jail or a $500 fine.
A41d., at 93.
"See MD. ANN CODE art. 27 § 15(d). (e)( (g) (1967).
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forfeit a stationhouse bail fixed as low as twenty-five dol-
lars and avoid trail.36
The United States, the Soviet Union and West Ger-
many are the most notable of the countries in western
civilization which severely punish private homosexuality
between consenting adults. Such predominantly Roman
Catholic countries as France, Italy, Mexico and Uraguay
do not include such conduct in their penal codes, nor do
predominantly Protestant Denmark and Sweden. The
British Parliament eliminated the crime in 1967, as did
Canada. 7
In most jurisdictions, one has the right to be a homo-
sexual, but no right to participate in homosexual activ-
ity. 38 A person may not be punished for a status over
which he or she has no control (a familiar example is al-
coholism), but that same person may be prosecuted for
an activity relating to such status (e.g. public drunken-
ness).
A few years ago the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney3 9 handed down a somewhat
distressing opinion. There the plaintiffs sought a declara-
tory judgment on the Virginia sodomy law as an uncon-
stitutional violation of their right to privacy. The District
Fisher, supra.
37 Id.
" Lasson, supra at 49-50.0)403 F. Supp. 1199 (1975). aff'd mem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
FORUM
Court declared that the right to privacy extended only to
married couples and not to homosexual relationships,
and that the "promotion of morality and decency" was
a sufficient basis for the prohibition of private sodomy.
40
This decision was affirmed without opinion by the Su-
preme Court.
Doe is hard to reconcile with Eisenstadt v. Baird,4 '
which extended the right of privacy to unmarried het-
erosexual couples. Therefore, the Doe court's first con-
clusion, that the right of privacy extends only to married
couples appears to be clearly erroneous. And it is cer-
tainly arguable that the "promotion of morality and de-
cency" would be just as adversely affected by extending
the right of privacy to couples "living in sin". The Su-
preme Court's summary affirmance, therefore, comes as
somewhat of a surprise, but carries little precedential
weight. 42
Doe also serves to articulate another facet of homo-
sexual rights litigation: homosexuals are not viewed as a
"suspect class", against whom any discrimination must
be subject to the "strict scrutiny" test, but instead are
treated as a group to which the less severe "rational
basis" standard is applied. 3 Many urge the middle-level
40 Id., at 1202.
41405 U.S. 438 (1972).
42 Lasson, supra at 56.
43 1d., at 57.
scrutiny afforded to cases involving discrimination based
on sex.
As Doe was decided prior to Barnes, the courts will
face an open question. In view of the wording of the
sexual harassment guidelines-handed down by the
EEOC where no mention is made as to gender of either
the harasser or the victim, the liberal intent of Barnes re-
mains in sufficiently broad EEOC language.
44
On the other hand, the courts do not always feel con-
strained to follow the EEOC guidelines. In addition, the
language used in Barnes was much broader than the
case required, which would give a less liberal court an
easy excuse for holding otherwise if faced with a harass-
ment complaint by a homosexual.
The problem could be solved rather simply, if Con-
gress would enact legislation prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual preference. Such legislation has been
proposed, 45 but is currently tied up in the House Judici-
ary Committee. It can be hoped that the courts or the
legislatures will recognize that harassment, of anyone,
for any reason, is offensive to human dignity and there-
fore should be actionable.
44Sec. 1604.11, BNA :pg 401:185.45 See H 2074, 96th Cong. ist Session (1979): S 2081, 96th Cong.,
1st Session (1979). Both proposed bills would prohibit employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
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